Artículo sobre la probabilidad de que ISIL atente en España.
Publicado: Sab, 03 Ene 2015, 18:55CNP Modelo Squad |
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FUENTE: http://xn--gesndespaa-19a.blogspot.co.u ... ks-in.html
According to the International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, about 83 Spanish citizens / residents are currently fighting in Syria or Iraq and many of them probably for ISIL (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), although to specify a figure is difficult. Therefore, it becomes important to evaluate, in terms of capability, intention and opportunity, the likelihood and the way that some of those jihadists could perpetrate an attack in Spain when they return from war. Despite jihadists have today fewer opportunities to attack in the EU because most of the governments have already become aware of the threat that jihadism entails, and legislation, cooperation and investment on counter-terrorism have been undertaken, the Jewish Museum of Belgium shooting carried out by an ex member of ISIL is a good example to realize that the threat that returnees pose is real. From my perspective, returned fighters should be always considered as potential solo jihadists since they are likely to keep network ties with ISIL.
Experts on terrorism such as Thomas Hegghammer (2013) have pointed out that around 10% of the fighters who went abroad between 1990 and 2010 came back interested in attacking in Europe.[i] In Spain only the returning of a jihadist who fought for ISIL during 8 months and admitted his participation in the assault of the Abu Ghraib Iraqi prison has been reported so far; the arrest took place at the Malaga airport in January 2014. However, it seems to me that the main reason why it is particularly important to focus on solo jihadism resides in the fact that, as Hegghammer also argues, returnees are more effective operatives than jihadists without experience of fighting abroad due to the motivation and expertise acquired: solo terrorists were behind all the individual jihadist plots that caused fatalities in the EU between 1995 and 2013. Overall, these trends cannot be completely extrapolated to our case, albeit they provide a reasonable approach to the prediction of a similar scenario in Spain.
In theory, the first measures to prevent attacks carried out by returnees would be focused on stopping the current flow of potential jihadists from Spain to Syria and Iraq, but this may involve some negative side effects triggering worse outcomes. Keeping in mind that since 2013 nearly 70% of the people arrested because of activities related to jihadism are Spanish, one of those measures could be the stripping of citizenship. The Directive 2004/38/EC allows Member States to temporary expel any citizen on imperative grounds of public security if his or her personal behavior represents a genuine, present and serious threat to the respective country. Nonetheless, it appears to me that this preventive action would be counterproductive for the rest of the EU countries by letting a would-be jihadist to enter their territory.
In order to avoid losing track of potential jihadists a possible measure could be the confiscation of passports, but this one is not allowed in our country and I personally believe that forcing would-be jihadists to stay in Spain instead of ‘waging jihad’ would frustrate them and maybe increase their intention of perpetrating an attack in our homeland. The fact is that months or even years of surveillance, analysis and eventually arrests become useless if there is not enough evidence gathered against jihadists and it is particularly complicated to prove that they have travelled to Turkey in order to enter Syria or Iraq and join the insurgency instead of doing it due to any other kind of reason. The majority of jihadists arrested in Spain since 2013 (34 out of 40) were integrated in a cell, so it is my opinion that the best prevention to adopt is to continue investigating the ramification and contacts of the current recruitment cells.
I would argue that the degree of threat depends on several factors, namely: our military contribution in the US-led coalition against ISIL, the independent recruitment cells already established in our country, and finally the efficiency of our border security system. The background of solo and lone-wolf jihadism is not included because I consider that the 3 cases reported in Spain since the 2004 Madrid train bombings cannot be used to foresee a trend. The number of jihadists who joined for example the insurgency in the Iraqi War is by far lower than those who are participating in the Syrian Civil War and, therefore, the expected number of returnees from the latter is more elevated. Around 95 Spanish citizens / residents have travelled to Syria in barely 4 years compared to the 4 individuals that travelled to Iraq in 8 years (from the beginning of the Iraq War until the beginning of the Syrian conflict). Despite there are not enough reports on jihadists travelling from Spain to Iraq in that period, the available data seems to be coherent with the small figure of about the 100 who travelled from Europe to Iraq in 9 years (from 2001 to 2010).[ii]
Firstly, with regard to the role that Spain plays in the US-led intervention in Iraq, the Council of Ministers approved in October 2014 the sending of a military staff of 300 to train the Iraqi Army. The training of local forces would be included in a category that I name ‘medium-risk measures’ in terms of being conceived as a direct enemy from the point of view of ISIL and, thereby, being more likely to suffer a terrorist attack. Since September, our terrorist warning level is 2 (high) in its high intensity degree, which implies a likely risk of attack. To my mind, any antiterrorist protection - prevention plan should not be an automatic or rigid system and a significant uncontrolled return of fighters or direct threats from the terrorist group in relation to the sending of military staff mentioned could suggest raising the warning level to 3 (very high) in its low degree.
Secondly, regarding the recruitment of potential fighters to join ISIL, a cell consisting of 9 jihadists was dismantled in Madrid on June 16, 2014. The group, led by Lahcen Ikasrrien (ex member of the Abu Dahdah cell, which was the first Al Qaeda’s cell in Spain), not only recruited and sent jihadists to Syria and Iraq, but also trained them in a ranch situated in Ávila. Since 2013, four more independent recruitment cells have been dismantled, in Ceuta and Melilla. Although this sort of crimes are only a form of collaboration with terrorist groups, I would argue that the mere fact that a recruitment cell is well organized and has connections with those groups makes it able to plot attacks with relative ease.
Finally, in relation to the security of our border control, it is important to bear in mind that jihadists may leave from any country other than Spain or Morocco and return from another one instead of Turkey, which would difficult their tracking and arrest. In this sense, effective measures could be established trough the EU Passenger Name Record. The current PNR, which is the storage of data on air passengers often used by law enforcement agencies to identify them and analyze information related to their journey, is only agreed with the US, Australia and Canada. Contents of the PNR such as the travel itinerary would make it a more useful tool if every air carrier is bound to provide this sort of data on passengers flying between the EU and any country from outside, and if it is shared between the passenger information units of the Member States, as the European Commission has proposed.
It is also necessary to consider that jihadists may travel to Turkey by car, coach, train or vessel and, therefore, they may use the same sort of transport to return to Spain. With respect to land transport, the last case reported was on 19 December, 2014, when 3 Spanish residents were arrested in Bulgaria. Travelling by car is a good option for jihadists because the Schengen Agreement basically allows Spanish citizens, residents and owners of a long-stay visa to cross most of the EU without being subjected to border checks. Moreover, a journey for example from Barcelona to Istanbul could be relatively short, less than one day and a half. As far as I am concerned, the only possible measures could be to verify that the countries situated in the external border zone or the Mediterranean coast strictly abide by the regulation on checks and to foster an even narrower liaison with their respective intelligence agencies.
To conclude, in my opinion, ISIL will probably not look in the near-term for establishing neither operative nor sleeper cells in our soil because, on the one hand, the Spanish Government will not probably be in favor of joining the launching of airstrikes against ISIL and, on the other, because perpetrating an attack trough an independent recruitment cell or a solo jihadist is easier and cheaper. Thus, attempts of solo jihadist attacks will probably be more common in the next years because those Spanish citizens / residents who return from Syria or Iraq are likely to keep some sort of contact with ISIL and, therefore, receive encouragement, assistance or even instructions.
Pd.: El Grupo está buscando a oficiales, subinspectores o inspectores del CNP para colaborar en temas de crimen organizado.
